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INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT AND THE PROBLEM
OF EQUITY FINANCING
HAmY G. GuimAtaN*
The general interest in the subject of this article results from the widespread
belief that equity, or common stock, financing in this country is greatly handicapped
by a lack of a suitable institutional supply of investment funds. The evidence for
this belief is found in the agitation for the creation of special private and govern-
mental agencies to do this job. It is also seen in the movement to permit regulated in-
stitutions and trustees to invest in common stocks even though investment con-
siderations may have provided the primary motivation. The literature of finance
offers further testimony on the point
The general lack of new private investment during the depressed i93o's led some
to underestimate the vitality of private enterprise. After the end of World War II
in 1945, however, the tempo of business continued at a high pace and ownership
funds as well as creditor funds flowed in on a substantial scale. The statistics of
bond flotations, bank loans, and mortgages sold give a widely used measure of the
creditor funds obtained, but relatively few stocks were sold. Because so much of
the new ownership investment consisted of retained earnings, the volume and im-
portance of the inflow of equity funds was greatly underestimated by many com-
mentators.
Not only did existing businesses expand their ownership investment during this
period, but a host of new businesses sprang up. The figure of 3,382,600 business
units in 194o, after declining during the war years to 3,045,100 in 1943, forged vig-
orously ahead to 3,976,400 or almost four million in 1948V As we shall see later, the
troubles of some business units, often founded and operated by none too skillful
persons, may explain some of the complaints of an inadequate supply of capital
funds. Such businessmen find the rationalization of "inadequate capital" more com-
forting than "ineflficient operation" or "bad financial planning."
' A.B. 1917, Syracuse University; M.B.A. i92i, New York University; Ph.D. 1929, University of
Chicago; C.P.A. 1920. Morrison Professor of Finance, Northwestern University. Author, Tim ANALYSIS
OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (3d ed. 1942); co-author (wr-H HERBERT E. DOuOALL), CORPORATE
FINANCIAL POLICY (2d ed. 1948); (wITu RALPH E. BADGER), INVESTMENT PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES (4 th
ed. 1951). Contributor to FuNmMNTALs OF INvESTmENT BANKING (Investment Bankers Ass'n of Amer-
ica, 1949); KENYON E. POOLE (Ed.), FISCAL POLICIES AND Tm AmrICAN EcoNomsY (195i), and business
and financial periodicals.
1 Although any bibliography here is impossible, the range of ideas pro and con may be had from
three significant articles: Anderson, Trends in the Supply of Equity Capital, 28 HARv. Bus. EV. 79.89
(Sept. 1950); Bogen, The Importance of Equity Financing in the American Economy, 5 J. FINANCE
270-278 (June, 1950); Butler and Ulin, Business Needs for Venture Capital, 28 HArv. Bus. REV. 52-65
(July, 1950).
2 STATISTICAL ABrSTRACT OF nm UNITED STATES, 2950; SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, 2949 STATISnCAL
SUPPLEumNT (U. S. Dep't Commerce, May and June, 295o).
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The economist is concerned with the adequacy of capital supply to provide the
economically competent businessman sufficient means to produce the nation's goods
and services rather than with the troubles of the individual business. For him the
over-all evidence of extraordinary production during World War II and of an ex-
panding national productivity since, of substantial growth in industrial capacity, and
of expansion in the number of business units should raise some doubts as to the
acuteness of the so-called "equity financing problem." This article will (I) analyze
the investment problems of our leading financial institutions which explain the
difficulties in the way of their helping with equity financing, (2) study how certain
other institutional arrangements are increasingly meeting the problem, (3) analyze
how business has raised equity capital as well as it has during the last decade, and
(4) attempt throughout to discover any inadequacies of our institutional machinery,
especially under the changing conditions of the last two decades. An understanding
of these points is essential if the problems of equity financing are to be met wisely
in shaping legislative and tax policies.
I
PERTINENT INVEMvIENT FACTORS IN INSTITUTIONAL INVEST MNT
Perhaps the most important factor influencing the investment policy of our
major financial institutions is the contractual arrangement under which they acquire
their funds from the public. The great bulk of the funds is acquired by the major
institutions by assuming a fixed dollar debt. These institutions are the banks, both
commercial and savings; the savings and loan associations; and the life insurance
companies. To remain solvent, they must keep a sufficient amount of fixed
value assets on hand to cover these liabilities. The government through the
regulatory process sets standards of solvency and often fixes the permissible kinds
of investments. Both commercial and savings banks derive the bulk of their funds
from depositors to whom they are obligated to repay a fixed amount of dollars
either on demand or on short notice. This contract imposes not only a requirement
of solvency but of liquidity as well, the latter varying with the type of institution and
the character of its deposits.
Technically the funds of the savings and loan associations are supplied by share-
holders rather than depositors (the depositor in the mutual savings bank occupies
a somewhat similar legal position). While the distinction is important in the
sharing of earnings, the shareholder in these associations is protected by regulation
that requires that the association meet tests of solvency for the dollar amount of his
investment including both the original sum and any accumulated dividend credits.
His account is kept much like that of a bank depositor. The practice of allowing
withdrawals that became widespread during the 192o's has made these associations
very similar in operation to a bank. Under the law governing federally chartered
associations, they are, however, not required to allow withdrawals in full even after
due notice, but can limit them to a percentage of their net cash receipts. This
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privilege might seem to relax their need for liquidity even if not their solvency re-
quirements. In practice, any association which hopes to remain in business must
meet withdrawal requests with promptitude in order to command the confidence
necessary to acquire and hold the funds of the community.
Life insurance companies, both stock and mutual, derive the great bulk of their
assets from policyholders. In order to maintain a level premium over a lifetime
during which the risk of death is rising, an excess premium is collected in the early
years and set aside as a "reserve" to bear the burden of higher death losses in later
years, which would otherwise cause a steadily rising premium. This "reserve" ele-
ment in the premium is exactly computed on the basis of certain assumptions as to
future mortality, interest earnings, and expenses, and after its collection is shown as
a definite amount of liability to the policyholders. The company is bound to keep
this amount of assets on hand or suffer the penalty of being declared insolvent
by the regulatory authorities. Moreover, the company is obligated to pay, or
loan, back substantially the full amount of this "reserve" under the cash surrender
and loan provisions of most policy contracts.
A considerable point has been made of the lack of fluctuation of assets held by
life insurance companies in spite of these provisions. Even in the two worst de-
pression years, 1932 and 1933, cash receipts greatly exceeded cash outgo at least for
the major companies This point does have importance in reducing the need for
liquidity of life insurance investments, but leaves unsolved the problem of solvency.
For an institution with substantial fixed dollar liabilities, assets of fluctuating value
pose a problem that must be met either by an adequate surplus of assets over debts
or some standard of valuation that permits the regulatory authorities to ignore some
part of the fluctuations that would otherwise spell insolvency.
Let us first consider the cushion for absorbing losses or fluctuations of the financial
institutions mentioned thus far. The following table shows the comparative im-
portance of the liabilities of each and their "surplus" for absorbing losses too great
to be borne by current earnings. The safety margin in the case of the stock corpora-
tions, such as the commercial banks and some of the life insurance companies, con-
sists of the capital stock, surplus, and surplus reserves. For the mutual institutions,
such as the savings banks, savings and loan associations, and most of the life insurance
business, there is no stock but only surplus and reserves built up by the retention of
part of the earnings in good years.
The table shows a range of "surplus" over liabilities of between 5 and io per cent,
which represents an average of all the units in a given field. Individual concerns
would deviate from these figures. If a concern with a io per cent surplus invested
io per cent of its assets in fluctuating common stocks then a change of one percentage
point in the value of such stocks would produce a corresponding percentage change
in surplus. A decline of stock values of 50 per cent would dissipate half the surplus.
' Badger, Unusual .Features of Life Insurance Investing, 6 J. FINcVE 78 (June, X95 1).
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SURPLUS OVER LIABILITIES OF LEADING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
(PERCENTAGES)
Life Insr. Mutual Savings National Savings &
Companies* Bankst Bankst Loan Assns.t
1940 1949 1940 1949 1940 1949 1940 1949
Liabilities ............. 94.1 93.0 89.2 90.1 90.6 93.2 91.4 92.2
"Surplus" ............. 5.9 7.0 10.8 9.9 9.4 6.8 8.6 7.8
Totals ............. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Dollar Totals (billions).. $30.8 $59.6 $12.0 $21.5 $36.9 $85.1 $5.7 $14.6
Sources: *SPECTATOR LIFE INSURANCE YEAnoo.
tANNUAL REPORTS OF THE COMPTROLLER OFTHE CURRENCY.
NDS in TE SAvINGs AND LOAN FIELD 5 (Home Loan Bank Board, 1950).
Herein lies the danger of fluctuating assets to these financial institutions and the
common tendency to restrict common stock investments by law even for life in-
surance companies to from 3 to io per cent of assets. Actually the more fundamental
relation is that of risk assets to the cushion of surplus rather than to the total assets.
This idea is found in the limitation in the recently passed New York law permitting
common stocks for life insurance companies to the lesser of 3 per cent of admitted
assets or one-third of the surplus. Clearly some surplus is essential to absorb losses
on even fixed value debt investments It is possible that a life insurance company
with a small "surplus" would feel that all of it was necessary to absorb such other
losses and consequently steer clear of any common stock holdings.
In passing it may be noted that liquidity requirements as well as solvency stand-
ards may influence the feeling of need for a protective surplus of assets over liabilities.
One savings bank executive stated that he believed savings banks required more of
such "surplus" than life insurance companies because of the greater possibility of de-
posit withdrawals as compared with life insurance policy surrenders. This possi-
bility meant a cushion was needed to absorb possible losses if debt investments should
have to be sold at a time when withdrawals coincided with low market prices. Such
price fluctuations can and do occur in the prices of high quality bonds, such as those
of the United States Government, without reflecting any change in credit standing or
risk of loss but only an adjustment to a higher level of interest rates. A savings
bank might regard the risk of such adverse price fluctuation in a long-term bond at an
inopportune time as small in relation to the greater yield such bonds have offered in
recent years in comparison with short-term investments of greater price stability.
Commercial banks, on the other hand, have shown a general policy of investing
'In this connection, the loss experience of Massachusetts savings banks during the 1930's is significant.
JOHN V. LINTNER, MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS IN THE SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE MARKETS (X948). The in-
vestment losses of leading life insurance companies during a period of stress arc reported in OPERATING
RESULTS AND INVESTMENTS OF THE TwENTY-SIx LARGEST LEGAL RESERVE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES IN
THE UNrE STATES, 1929-38 (submitted by the Securities and Exchange Commission to the Temporary
National Economic Committee, 1939).
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their demand deposits in either short-term loans or Governments of short maturity
since the early i93o's to assure holdings of suitable price stability.
Before turning to the possibilities of a solution to the problem of common stock
investments by these financial institutions through some scheme of valuation that
ignores or provides for some part of these market price fluctuations, the unusual posi-
tion of the fire and casualty insurance companies should at least be mentioned. Al-
though less important in terms of assets than the groups treated thus far, their invest-
ment practice underlines the customary emphasis upon market price for valuation and
the need for an equity "cushion" by a financial institution that would hold common
stocks. The accompanying table shows not only the more substantial "policy-holders'
surplus" for these insurance companies than for the previously discussed financial
institutions, but also their larger relative investment in stocks. Even the life insurance
companies invested less than 3 per cent of assets in all stocks and less than I per
cent in common stocks. The various kinds of fire and casualty companies held stocks
of from 6 to 34 per cent of assets in I949.
But after the present philosophy of our financial institutions has been understood,
the question still arises: Could not at least the life insurance companies with their
lesser need for liquidity invest more in common stocks and be reasonably allowed
to adopt some different basis than market price for valuation purposes ?0 Proposals
BALANCE SHEET PROPORTIONS OF FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANIES: [949
FIRE & MARIN CASUALTY
Stock Mutual Stock Mutual
Liabilities and Surplus
Liabilities ................................. 55.9 .54.2 67.5 71.9
Policyholders' Surplus:
Capital stock or guaranty funds ............ 8.4 2.2 6.8 .8
Voluntary and contingency reserves ......... 2.9 4.4 5.0 5.0
Net Surplus ............................. 32.8 39.2 20.7 22.3
Total "Surplus ......................... 44.1 45.8 32.5 28.1
Liabilities and Surplus .................... 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Assets
Cash ...................................... 9.4 10.5 9.7 9.4
Bonds .................................... 46.2 64.7 59.5 75.3
Stocks .................................... 35.9 15.2 19.4 5.8
Mortgage Loans ............................ .4 2.4 .6 1.6
Agents' balances and other assets ............. 8.1 7.2 10.8 7.9
Total Assets ............................. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total Assets (millions) ...................... $5,563 $ 994 $4,112 $1,334
Source: SPECrATOR INSURANcE YEAR Boox'. 1950.
' A fuller discussion of the investment policies of these and the other financial institutions may be
found in R. E. BADoER AND H. G. GTJTHmANN, INVESMENT PRIcNPLEs AND PAcrsCES (4 th ed. x95i),
Chapter 26, Investment Policy: Financial Institutions.
' A fuller treatment of this question is given by Fraine, The Valuation of Security Holdings of Life
Insurance Companies, 6 J. FINANCE 124-138 (June, i95), and the discussion of that paper by Harry
L. Severson, id. at 139-142.
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usually take the form of shifting from market value to cost with some plan for using
extra yield and appreciation to set up reserves for possible losses and declines in
market valuej The supporting arguments are an analogy with the valuation of
bonds by life insurance companies, an analysis of the economics of risk, and criticism
of current market price as a measure of value for the purpose in hand.
Life insurance companies when purchasing bonds are expected to purchase only
those of predominantly investment quality and these are shown initially in the
accounts and the balance sheet at cost. Subsequently any premium or discount from
par value is systematically written off (or amortized) over the life of the bond. The
rate of yield becomes a constant rate of return on the changing book value and the
balance sheet adopts this amortized value for measuring solvency. Market value
changes are ignored so long as the bond does not default or lose its investment
rating.8
The essential thinking behind this treatment is that the cash needs of the life
insurance company are such that they can be met by premium receipts, investment
income, and repayments of principal from investments. The company should be able
to hold its bond purchases more or less permanently or till maturity. Thus, a going
concern standard of value rather than liquidation value as measured by market price
is employed in accounting and measuring solvency. When bonds are purchased for
long-term holding and with no intention of resale for the purpose of meeting with-
drawals, it is believed logical to ignore market fluctuations that are not caused by a
loss of credit standing sufficient to threaten the payment of interest and principal.
In this connection, it should be noted that solvency for a life insurance company
requires not only that it own sufficient assets to cover "reserve" indebtedness, but
that each year it must earn on this reserve the rate of interest assumed at the incep-
tion of the contract. Three decades ago that assumed rate guaranteed to the policy-
holder was ordinarily set at 3 or 3Yz per cent. Today it is more often 2/2 per cent,
sometimes 2 or 2 per cent. This stipulation for the life of the policy creates
a special problem not found in either banks or savings and loan associations where
the return may vary from year to year. Consequently, the life insurance company
must not only solve the problem of having enough assets to cover debts at the end
of each year, but must earn a minimum rate of return each year determined by its
policy contracts. A return that included the gain or loss from market price changes
would produce unhappily irregular results that would ignore the long-term obliga-
tion to earn a regular though low rate of compound interest. In this respect, studies
which merely show a high average return could have been earned on a fund of com-
' On this point see Nerlove, Common Stocks as Investments for American Life Insurance Companies:
A Non-Academic View, 3 J. FINANcE 39-5X (Oct. 1948), and 4 id. 60-77 (Mar. 1949).
" That even on the basis of market value bonds of quality fare well is indicated by a comparative
study of Metropolitan Life and Sun Life in the early 1930's. The latter held 56.8 per cent of assets in
stocks, chiefly common, in 1930. The precipitous decline thereafter resulted in a change in policy so that
in 1949 holdings of common had declined to 4.8 and preferred to 2.3 per cent of assets. Guthmann
and Dauer, Stock vs. Bonds as Life Insurance Investments during Depression, 13 HAmv. Bus. Rav. 237
(Jan. 1935).
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mon stocks over a period of years are inadequate.9 The showing year by year is
required to cover this important point.
Unfortunately when we try to transfer the going concern value approach from
bonds to common stocks, certain differences crop up. Common stocks have no fixed
maturity value towards which market price is drawn so long as the debtor is solvent.
Dividends are not a fixed return but fluctuate with business conditions and, for most
stocks, to some extent with the price level. Before cost can be used in place of market
value some assurance must exist that that figure will not result in a gross over-
valuation when applied as a test of solvency.
One possible test of the validity of cost would be the current dividend return on
that figure. So long as the dividends provided a rate of return on investment cost
adequate to maintain the interest accrual required by policy contracts, it might be
argued that the investment was adequate on a going concern base. Others might
suggest that this minimum rate of return which would justify a cost valuation
should be not less than the rate of return on the choicest of "riskless" bonds. The
debate would also extend to whether the test should apply to the valuation of in-
dividual stocks or of the total of all stocks held. Custom would argue for testing
the individual stock even though it might be argued that risk must be judged on
group performance and that ability to continue as a going concern is a total asset
problem.
Opponents of such an innovation would point out the dangers of "artificial"
valuations in view of the demand liability nature of the cash surrender and loan pro-
visions of the standard life insurance contracts. They would also point out how con-
siderably dividends fluctuate with conditions so that the test might well give exces-
sive valuations in good times that would encourage stock purchases at prices that
would be fatally high in later depression years. Actually, under the proposed test of
cost the investing life insurance company would need to ask the question at the time
of purchase as to whether the stock being bought would be likely to pay a dividend
equal to the stipulated rate of return on cost even during the most depressed years
of business and in addition provide enough yield to cover the losses in this field
of greater uncertainty and risk.' °
9 For example, see, for both annual and cumulative performance, A REPORT IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSED
AmENDmmNTs TO ARTICLE 5, SEcro 81, OF THHE NEw YORK INSURANCE LAW 68-95, 145-X49 (submitted
to the Joint Committee on Insurance Rates and Regulation of the State of New York by the Life
Insurance Association of America and the American Life Convention, January, 1951).
" Nothing is said here of the possible use of a moving average of stock prices, say for the preceding
three years, as a substitute for the customary year-end market price. Such an average price has no
relation to the going concern value argument, which must be anchored to yield. While such a test
would at times be less severe than a one-date price and give a more "representative" price, it would
create new problems. It could give a very high "value" after a long boom and be so low after a pro-
longed depression as to prevent investment at what could be reasonable prices. Attempts at a "long-
term value" measurement by some objective formula are likely to be illusory for the generality of common
stocks. This difficulty is inherent in the fluctuating nature of income and the element of futurity in the
income to be measured. An objective measure is a prime necessity for any regulatory standard, which
explains the common reliance on market prices.
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Clearly the least that is needed to justify common stock investment even under a
new standard of valuation would be empirical studies that would indicate that
stocks of the type deemed desirable would meet the income and solvency needs of
life insurance companies year by year. Even though some excellent work has been
done, studies are as yet unavailable that would cover both of these two points.
Space does not permit a critical evaluation of the published research here.'1 For
the purposes of our discussion, however, two points should be mentioned. Most of
the studies have studied group performance for combined dividends and appreciation
over a period of years. This approach would give end results such as are obtained
under a system of revaluation at market instead of cost. Very generally, however,
information is lacking on one or more of the following points we have seen to be
relevant under a system that used cost and had a problem of annual performance:
(i) annual dividend performance relative to cost is lacking, (2) figures are not shown
on an annual basis, or (3) the problem of maintaining annual solvency is not con-
sidered. It is insufficient for a life insurance company to earn a high average
return. It must add the stipulated return to its reserve liability each and every
year. High average return is also no substitute for continuous solvency by some
standard of valuation, whether market, cost, or cost less some valuation reserve.
The results of some studies are greatly influenced by the particular years selected
to begin and terminate the sample period. So large are the price fluctuations of most
common stocks that one only needs to look at a chart of stock prices to judge how
largely the factor of dates selected will influence end results that include price
appreciation and depreciation.
One of the most interesting pieces of evidence favorable to long-term investment
in common stocks has been the statistics of leading industrial common stock prices
carried back to the beginning of the century.' These figures show a remarkably
regular long-term growth trend for the past half century at a rate slightly over
32 per cent per year. Furthermore, the fluctuations about the trend have been con-
tained for the most part within a band that runs somewhat over one-third of the
value of the trend line on either side of it. An extraordinary rise above this band
of price range occurred in the four bull market years of i927-i93o. It fell below in
the two years i932-i933 and again in the three years 1940-1942. So impressive does
Fraine find this record that he states: "Historically, the risk in common stocks as a
class has been a short-time rather than a long-time risk, a risk of cyclical rather
than secular depreciation."' 3
If such long-term regular growth could be reliably projected into the future for
all common stocks, a far more satisfactory basis for investment would be laid than
" For a summary and brief discussion of such leading studies as those by Edgar L. Smith, Rose,
Jackson, Rodkey, and others, see BADGER AND GUTmMANN, op. cit. supra note 5, at Chapter 6, The Return
on Investment.
12 A reproduction of Standard & Poor's Long-Term Index of Industrial Stocks: i9oo-r949, is given in
BADGER AND GuTHmANN, Op. cit. supra note 5, at 149.
" Fraine, supra note 6, at I28.
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has yet been regarded as possible. Indeed, if such a basic trend could be relied upon,
the likelihood of long-term price appreciation or depreciation could be estimated from
the market level at the time of purchase with reference to this imputed trend. Or
better still, investment policy might confine purchases to those periods in which
the stock market was below the trend line.14 Consistent results would seem most
likely for the large investor, such as an institution with sufficient funds to purchase
a representative cross-section of the market represented by these averages.
However valid such a projection of the past into the future may prove to be, the
basic problems of regular income and of valuation remain to be worked out or tested.
There is, of course, the possible argument that cost or cost less some valuation reserve
might be safely employed on the basis of these figures on the theory that at. some
future time any market depreciation will be offset by the automatic working of the
growth factor.
Actually, three major factors may be mentioned which might interfere with the
conclusion that this pattern of common stock prices is the probable pattern for the
future of stocks generally:
(i) The growth trend described was based upon industrial rather than all com-
mon stocks. This point has special significance because of the differences in differ-
ent fields of business. As late as the 192o's, railroads were regarded as a growth in-
dustry and railroad common stocks enjoyed a better investment standing than in-
dustrials. Not until that decade were industrials regarded as suitable for other than
speculative commitments. During the following decade only a very few railroads
were able to maintain an unbroken dividend.
Electric and telephone utility operating company common stocks would be ex-
pected to offer less opportunity than industrials for growth in value but greater
stability both as to income and value.'5 Their business represents a low-priced con-
sumers' service likely to enjoy stable demand. It is largely monopolistic. In the
last two decades a fixed original cost-less-depreciation valuation has been increasingly
adopted by regulatory commissions as the base upon which a fair rate of return
should be allowed. Reproduction value has been increasingly ignored since Supreme
Court decisions made that possible.'8
Some regard bank stocks of better quality as more stable commitments than
industrial common stocks because their assets consist of cash, loans, bonds, and
mortgages-all fixed dollar value items (Massachusetts, for example, made bank
stocks permissible investments for mutual savings banks in i95o). The high mor-
tality among American banks in the past is believed unlikely of repetition because
"
4 For an investment formula based upon this theory, see LtmLE TOMLINSON, SUCCESSFUL INVESTINO
FORmULAS (rev. ed. 595o).
"= The possibilities of investment in this field have been explored in bIoN B. HowARD, PUBLIO UILrT
CoMMoN STOCKS AS POSSIBLE INVEsIENTS FOR LIFE INSURANCE CoMANIaS (unpublished doctoral thesis,
Northwestern University, 1950).
"Los Angeles' Gas & Electric Corporation v. Railroad Commission of California, 289 U. S. 287
(1933). Also Lindhcimer v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 292 U. S. 151 (1934).
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of the panic preventive nature of federal deposit insurance and the more conservative
investing and lending policies since the banking debacle of 1934.
(2) The record of growth was made by a wide variety of industrial stocks of all
qualities, which might not be representative of performance by such stocks as would
qualify as investment media. While stocks that would be regarded as suitable for
institutional investment might out-perform the averages in their growth in
value, the opposite might be true. It is easy to forget that the well-regarded
stocks of today may have been the speculations of yesteryear, particularly during
their early life history when they made their greatest growth. Investment quality
implies by definition seasoned issues with an established dividend record. It would
seem likely that such established companies would grow at a slower rate than
younger companies and might well show a declining rate of earnings on gross in-
vestment in later years.
(3) The growth record was made during a half century characterized for the
most part by a rising trend of commodity prices, which trend might change in the
future. During the fifty years, 19oo-i949, the wholesale commodity price index of
the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics rose by 167 per cent, or at an average
annual rate of 1.98 per cent. This influence would be expected to be very favorable
to industrial corporations with their assets consisting chiefly of plant and equipment,
natural resources, and inventories (in contrast utilities under the present regulatory
practice and banks would have fixed dollar value assets). The rising price level
could thus explain a substantial part of the industrial stock growth trend of the
last five decades.
Political cynics regard an inflationary trend for the future as an almost inevitable
result of present economic and fiscal policies of our American government. The
unsettled world outlook creates additional inflationary pressures. Nevertheless, a
change of trend in the price level should be recognized as possible. Some regard
the postwar boom as merely deferring rather than eliminating the danger of a re-
actionary deflation. They point to the precedents of other inflations followed by de-
flation. A younger generation of businessmen and economists are prone to forget
that the United States witnessed a declining trend in the commodity price level
that lasted for a generation. It ran from the end of the War of the States in 1865
to 1896 or a period of three decades.
Most studies of common stocks have necessarily been confined to years since
that period. It is even doubtful as to how useful any record of their performance
under the very different economic and political conditions prior to i9oo would be
for interpreting current conditions. Most economists would probably agree that
a stable or declining price level would have reduced the price appreciation of in-
dustrial common stocks from what was seen between 19oo and i95o.
In this connection, it is important to point out that any class of stocks that is
favored by rising commodity prices is correspondingly hazardous for life insurance
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company investment during.a period of deflation. Those who urge life insurance
investment in common stocks as a "hedge against inflation" are wont to ignore the
fact that insurance contracts are dollar contracts for debt that allow no adjustments
for price level change. They are also silent as to what would happen to financial
institutions of this type during a deflationary period.
Much of what has been said here about these studies of common stock investment
performance is a warning as to their empirical nature. In any worth while dis-
cussion of this sort, we must go beyond such a general warning and come to grips
with the specific considerations which may cause the probable future to differ from
the experience of the past. The possible degree of difference between the two con-
stitutes the measure of risk in acting upon experience and is a matter of judgment.
It is true that the very successful institution of insurance is itself based upon the
statistics of the past with adjustments from time to time to meet changing condi-
tions. There is a danger that the relatively certain results obtained in that field will
lead to the belief that a similar degree of certainty can be had in the field of equity
investment. Such certainty seems unlikely. The most obvious, though not the only
risk-witness the novel troubles of the railroads since i93o-is that of cyclical
fluctuation. The records of the past show how irregular that influence has been in
timing, duration, and intensity upon business volume, profits, and dividends. Its
impact has varied greatly upon financial institutions within a given field even in the
relatively predictable matter of debt investment. Equity investment presumably
would produce more diverse results.
Two important results of these studies of risk and the increased interest in
equity investment may be a more systematic provision for losses and more logical
tax treatment of such allowances. 7 The improvement should encompass investment
in bonds and preferred stocks as well as in any common stocks. Almost every
economic analysis of the subject of investment return has emphasized the extra rate
of return from risk investments as constituting a "premium for risk." Yet it is
difficult to find examples of financial institutions which have systematically set
aside this excess return to provide for investment losses. But since such losses occur
irregularly and chiefly in years of depression rather than year by year, it is most
desirable that the "premiums for risk" be earmarked as such and not appear as so
much additional current earnings. Most financial institutions appear to make no
such specific provision based upon excess yields but instead make irregular "appro-
priations of surplus" or they set up capital gains as a "contingency reserve," or
occasionally, as a "reserve for investment fluctuations." Only recently in the com-
mercial banking field has the federal corporation income tax law permitted an allow-
ance for possible future loan losses as a deductible expense in place of the actual exper-
ienced loss in the current year. The allowance is based upon long-term loss experience
of the past, however, rather than excess yield or any analysis of the quality of existing
loans.
" A central theme of Fraine, supra note 6.
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An analogous provision for bond and stock investments by financial institutions
would have much to commend it, especially if the provision were related to the
quality of the investment as reflected in the market's appraisal. Yield differences
reflect the market's judgment of risk from time to time."8 Such allowance for loss
may result in either inadequate or excessive provision. It makes a considerable
difference to a financial institution whether such allowances are accepted practice.,
The income tax factor has been mentioned. So long as the provision is regarded as
optional and treated as a form of "contingency reserve" rather than as necessary and
a type of "valuation reserve" (such as the reserve for depreciation or for bad debts),
it is thought of as a financial luxury-nice if you can afford it. Moreover, some
institutions may wish to avoid what seems to be unusual accumulations of surplus.
The point would be particularly important in a state like New York where life
insurance companies are limited to a io per cent surplus accumulation. High yield
from risky investments whether dissipated as "dividends" to policyholders or
paid as income taxes to the government will not be available to meet losses when they
do occur in a depression.
The general tenor of our discussion thus far has been discouraging to the develop-
ment of an important place for common stocks in the portfolios of the financial insti-
tutions discussed. Of the four institutions discussed, only for the life insurance
companies has there been a strong advocacy for some equity investments. Even
though only a limited place at most would appear logical, the size of their total
assets makes any interest important. With present resources of more than 63 billion
dollars, even a i per cent allocation to equities would amount to 630 million dollars.
When we turn to certain other institutional arrangements we find very different
investment needs and a growing interest in common stocks. These include insti-
tutionally administered trusts, pension funds, and investment companies.
II
INSTITUTIONALLY ADMINISTERD TRusTs
A large and growing institutional channel through which funds flow into business
is the trust fund administered by a commercial bank. These banks will be referred
to here as trust companies even though the work is most often merely that of a
department of a state or national bank rather than that rare institution, a pure trust
company. Common stocks have been a much more popular holding for these funds
than for any of the financial institutions discussed hitherto. Although these insti-
tutional trusts and the financial institutions are both thought of as "fiduciaries"
in the popular mind, important differences exist in their requirements and invest-
"
8 Not all "excess return" over that on such "riskless" investments as United States bonds represents
premium for risk. Some part of a higher rate of return may be required for the expenses of initial in-
vestigation and subsequent supervision even in the case of investment quality bonds and preferred stocks.
More of such expense is incurred where whole loans are acquired as "direct placements." Expenses are
still larger as a per cent on investment for residential real estate mortgages than for bonds. Other
yield differentials result from differences in maturity, tax status, and marketability.
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ment policy. The trustee has no substantial fixed dollar liabilities as a rule and so
does not have the continuing solvency problem of the financial institution. Probably
the greater part of the claims to trust funds are determined by the income earned
or are shares in the principal at whatever value the latter may have. Exceptions
exist to whatever extent specific dollar incomes are dedicated to particular bene-
ficiaries or specified amounts are to be paid from corpus at a future time (pension
funds are an exception which will be discussed separately at a later point).
Investment policy should consequently be oriented toward the needs of the
beneficiaries rather than to meeting the twin problems of solvency and liquidity that
dominate the thinking of the major financial institutions discussed thus far. These
beneficiaries are typically individuals with a cost-of-living problem rather than a
dollar liability problem. Common stocks which provide some adjustment of income
to a changing price level are appropriate for this requirement. A rising tide of
sentiment favorable to common stocks over the last three decades has resulted not
only from recognition of their virtues as an inflation hedge but also from an expecta-
tion of extra gain in the form of price appreciation. This hope of appreciation is
based upon the increased values which may result from retained earnings and
expansion.
This increasing regard for common stocks as investment media has caused the
modification of laws governing the investment of trust funds. Although legality of
an investment for trustees is thought of as being determined by court decisions in
those states which follow the "prudent man rule," such jurisdictions have hastened
matters by legislation. In California, for example, trutees were specifically
authorized to invest in common stocks in 1943. Even New York, a notably con-
servative state in such matters, amended its laws in i95o to permit trustees to pur-
chase a total of common and preferred stocks that meet certain standards up to a
maximum of 35 per cent of a fund. Previously, the trustee had been substantially
restricted to the same investments as were legal for savings banks.
Trustees may and often are freed from these restrictions upon investment by the
terms of the trust instrument.19 Such freedom of action is logical in the large trusts
which are most likely to seek the professional administration of a trust company.
Larger trusts are able to diversify and so are better fitted to bear the risks of
equity investments. The trustee is more apt to favor common stocks when they
have been included in the original fund set up by the creator 20
Over a decade ago Riddle called attention to the substantial portion of trust
investments administered by national banks committed to common stocks. At that
time (1937), 2,555 million dollars or 314 per cent of the 8,135 million dollars of their
"o The Trust Investment Study Committee of the New York State Bankers Association found in a
study in 1949 of 20,000 trusts in that state with an aggregate value of Over $4 billion that the pro.
portion of trusts limited to legal investments was over about 20 per cent by value and not much over
30 per cent by number of accounts.
"0 This influence is discussed in- Riddle, Trust Investments: Their Extent and Some Related Economic
Problems, 5 LAW & CONTEmP. PROB. 339, 345-347 (1938).
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investment trust property was in stocks. This compared with x,26o million dollars
or 264 per cent of the 4,774 million dollars reported in 193i.21 Data elsewhere in
the same article indicate these were chiefly common stocks. By i95o these trust
funds held investments totalling 18,399 million dollars of which 4,215 million dollars,
or 22.9 per cent were in stocks.22 Since state-chartered banks have banking assets
equal to about three-fourths of those held by national banks, it would seem not
improbable that they might hold trust funds in a roughly proportionate ratio. Such
a ratio would mean trust investments for both types of commercial banks in excess
of 30 billion dollars.
Another bit of evidence pointing towards the increasingly favorable attitude of
conservative investors toward common stocks is found in the endowments of col-
leges and universities. While the figures are not strictly comparable for the two
years, the accompanying table may safely be read as showing a most remarkable
growth in common stock holdings from 11.5 per cent in 1931 to 30 per cent of the
total in i946.
COMPARISON OF PROPORTIONS OF UNIVERSITY AND COLLEGE
ENDOWMENT FUND INVESTMENTS: 1931, 1946
(The mean of the percentages of each fund at book value)
1931 1946
Bonds ........................... 50.5 42
Mortgages ........................ 17 5.5
Preferred stocks ................... 8.5 11.5
Common stocks ................... 11.5 30
Real estate ....................... 9.5 8
Cash and minor investments ........ 3 3
Totals ........................ 100 100
The trend has been slightly more marked for the institutions with larger endowment
funds. As in the case of individual beneficiaries of trust funds, a university has a
cost-of-living problem. Income is required to pay salaries and wages and buy
supplies. These costs change with the general price level. Some income shrinkage
can be borne with equanimity during deflation if counterbalanced by larger income
during inflation. Moreover, since the endowment is substantially perpetual, market
price fluctuations need not be a matter of concern.
Probably as important as any nicely reasoned argument that common stocks serve
as an inflation hedge, has been the widened yield differential between common
" Id. at 344.
"2 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER OF a CURRENCY (1950).
" The 1946 figures were compiled by SCUDDER, STEvENs & CLARK, SURVEY oF UNivaasinY AND
COLLErE ENDowErr FuNDs i9 (1947); the 1931 figures by WooD, STETmBERs & Co., TRusraasmp Os
AMmCAN ENDOWMENTs (X932), but the latter figures are as adjusted and reported in the first source.
For differences affecting comparison and variations in practice, see these sources.
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stocks and bonds since the early i930'S 4 Stock yields did not follow the declining
trend of bond yields after 1933. From a level around 5 per cent in the 1920's, high
grade bond yields declined to around 3 per cent by 194o. When it is realized that a 5
per cent return on invested endowment means two-thirds more income than a rate
of 3 per cent, the pressure to shift to a heavier proportion of common stocks can be
appreciated.
III
PENSION FuNDs
A special type of trust which is likely to have a substantial bearing on the sums
available for equity investment is the pension fund. These funds set aside by business
corporations are designed to supplement the Old Age and Survivors Insurance of the
Federal Government. Some corporate pension plans have been cared for by ordinary
annuity policy contracts with life insurance companies but the more substantial part
are based upon funds managed by trust companies. While satisfactory data are
lacking, one estimate by an officer of a trust company holding substantial pension
funds has placed the probable annual inflow of cash for pension trusts at i% billion
dollars. A substantial part is expected to be invested in common stocks, possibly
up to one-fourth of the totaU 5 Were such a figure approached, it would mean stock
purchases of almost a half billion a year. So long as excess profit taxes are levied,
corporations subject to that tax have a strong incentive to make extra contributions
to build up reserves for pensions that have accrued from past services of employees
prior to the setting up of the funds. A substantial part of these pension funds have
been of postwar origin since 1945, although the tax structure and wage restrictions of
the war period provided a major impetus for the establishment of many.
These pension liabilities would seem to resemble the annuity liabilities of the
life insurance company so closely that a similar fixed dollar investment policy might
seem to be indicated. No attempt will be made to resolve the debate here but
some of the chief arguments for a less restricted investment policy for pension
trusts may be outlined.
(i) The liability for pensions is more uncertain because
a) it is affected by the uncertain factor of labor turnover. An employee
who leaves the company before retirement may receive nothing except
such amounts as he may have contributed himself. The employer's
contributions remain to add support for the liability to the remaining
employees.
b) the arrangement itself is characteristically a matter of union bargaining
and may be changed from time to time.
c) benefits are typically a supplement to the federal Old Age and Survivors
"For a graphic comparison of such yields from 19oo to 1949, see BADGER AND GUTHMANN, op. dt.
supra, note 5, at 79.
"5 Central Hanover Pension Bulletin, April, 1950, pp. 2-3; id., July, 195r, pp. 3-4.
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Insurance which may change. When the scale of benefits for the' latter
was increased recently it reduced the liability of some corporations for
pension benefits substantially.
(2) In any case the pension fund is typically inadequate at the outset to cover
the accumulated liabilities for past services. Consequently any loss suffered
through the price fluctuations, from a fraction (say up to one-third of
portfolio) invested in common stock, is relatively unimportant. The long-
term solvency of such pension funds must depend primarily upon the cor-
poration's subsequent earnings and payroll being sufficient to permit ade-
quate contributions. It is generally more correct to think of the pension fund
as collateral to assist the business in carrying out its promises and to regard
the pension liabilities as a corporate rather than a trust fund obligation.
(3) The absence of cash surrender values, save for the small amounts sometimes
payable to employees who leave before retirement, means that security price
fluctuations can be more readily ignored by a pension fund than a life
insurance company.
Such arguments hinge upon a dependence upon the employing corporation's
earnings and an underlying belief in the long-term merits of common stock invest-
ments and that they will yield more even after losses than an equivalent amount of
fixed income investments. This expectation may go with a further belief in the
efficacy of some formula plan that attempts to take advantage of the larger swings
in the stock market." Nevertheless a company could suffer hardship if obliged to
make up a deficit caused by declines in common stock prices or dividends at a time
when its own earnings were depressed. After the employee has retired his pension
is fixed in dollars.
IV
INVESTMENT COMPANIES
Investment companies offer one of the most hopeful institutional devices for
channeling individual savings into equity investment. Basically they are in-
vestment pools through which the investor with a small sum can obtain diversi-
fication and management. They issue shares which have no fixed redemption
value and so can invest freely in fluctuating values. Their holdings are predominant-
ly common stocks. They give promise of developing into a major middleman be-
tween investors and equities in the way in which the savings banks and the savings
and loan associations have stood between investors and bonds and mortgages.
Among their misfortunes was their founding and rapid rise to prominence in the
speculative stock market boom in the late i92o's. Their losses were accentuated by
the heavy use of bonds and preferred stocks in their own capital structures so that
the effects of the ensuing recession and deflation were multiplied. Many of their
"6 See ToMLINSON, op. cit. supra, note 14.
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own shares shrank to a nominal value. Widespread disappointment and disillusion-
ment threatened to crush this institution new to the American scene. However, one
type of investment company, the mutual or open-end company, which avoided prior
securities and issued only common shares, gradually increased in popular esteem
and has enjoyed a rapid rate of growth since 1945. The rise in the stock market
even brought a renewal of interest in the speculative issues of the closed-end
companies whose stocks took on something of the character of a margin account
because of the fixed claims of their bonds and preferred stock.
The mutual fund companies that gained the greatest popular favor invested chiefly
in a diversified list of dividend-paying common stocks. Unlike the closed-end
companies which offer their securities only irregularly in blocks like the ordinary
business corporation, the mutual, open-end companies offer their shares for con-
tinous sale much like a savings and loan association. Similarly, they redeem their
shares at any time, but not at a fixed dollar value. Repurchase price is based upon
liquidation value, that is the market prices of their portfolio. The selling price,
in turn, is based upon these market values plus a "loading" charge, averaging
around 7Y2 per cent of the amount invested, to cover the sales commission and other
distribution costs.'
With high income and inheritance taxes reducing the savings of the wealthy as
a source of capital, the relative importance of the investor of moderate income has
grown. For the latter, a financial institution which assumes the cares of invest-
ment management and offers diversification to reduce risk is especially desirable. The
success of financial institutions in directing the savings of the thrifty into debt
investment is well known. The recent expansion of the investment company raises
the hope of their similar success in the field of equities. Two factors have favored
their recent growth. The first has been the relatively high dividend yields on market
price, which, even after paying the costs of the investment company, have been
substantially higher than the return offered by savings accounts in banks, savings and
loan shares, life insurance, or even the favored Series E United States Savings bonds.
The other factor has been the postwar inflation. Its effect in lost purchasing power
has been that of a huge capital levy upon the thrifty who have invested in debt obli-
gations. , Losses have far exceeded the small rate of interest paid even before any de-
duction is made for personal income taxes. Common stocks, on the other hand, have
provided rising dividend income and increasing market value to counterbalance this
inflation at least in part during this period.
The following figures show the postwar growth of the open-end investment
companies, which is the growing sector of this business. Their growth brought
them up to the closed-end companies in i95o. While the absolute amounts are
modestly small compared with the figures for the financial institutions investing in
debt, the growth rate of the open-end companies has been higher. But once initiated
into the nature of stocks, additional investment is likely to continue. The first sale
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GROWTH OF ASSETS OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES
(millions of dollars)
Year Open-end Closed-end
1950 ....................... 2,445 2,463
1949 ....................... 1,941 2,029
1948 ....................... 1,524 1,728
1947 ....................... 1,411 1,799
1946 ...................... . 1,297 1,931
1945 ....................... 1,265 2,103
Source: SEcuRrns AND Exca woa Cowassiow STA !CAL BU.mnxs.
is the most difficult to make. Thereafter, the influence of continued personal sales-
manship behind this institution should be an important expansive force. Because
of the influence of market fluctuations the annual changes are a mixture of price
change and additional shares.
V
Is m SuPPLY OF EQUITY FUNDS ADEQUATE?
With the largest financial institutions devoted almost wholly to debt investment
and only the trust funds, including pension funds, and the investment companies
providing important institutional channels into common stocks, concern over the
adequacy of investment in equities is easy to understand. Scanty information as to
the amount and character of the investments of the funds administered by the trust
companies has also caused their importance to be overlooked or underrated. The
greatest impact of both pension funds and investment companies upon the capital
markets almost certainly lies in the future.
Another argument used to show that the equity capital supply is inadequate has
been the widened spread between the yields of bonds and stocks. Dividend yields
have failed to follow the declining trend of high grade bond yields in the last two
decades. Such evidence must be read with care. Dividend yields are not wholly
comparable with bond yields. They relate the current dividend to current market
price. Unlike the fixed return on a bond, the dividend may fluctuate and investors
must look ahead in estimating probable long-run yield. Many investors in the
postwar years have been constantly fearful of a waning of the boom. The higher
level of commodity prices has also been suspect. Under such conditions the high
current yield is regarded as temporary and market price, even though possibly mis-
taken, discounts the expected lower return. The current defense effort, similarly,
is regarded by many as an extension of a temporary boom. Dividend yields might
go lower as the result of either a decline in dividends as expected by such pessimistic
investors or a change in investment temper that could cause prices to rise relative to
dividends. Another possibility is that common stock yields may never decline so low
as bond yields just as bond yields never decline to the lowest levels reached by short-
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term money rates. Space forbids a full-dress analysis but one reason would be that
the perpetual maturity of common stocks gives them an inherently greater fluctua-
tion of price range just as long-term bonds move more widely than short maturities.
A given increase in yields above what the market has come to accept as "normal"
means so much greater hazard of price reaction for common stocks than for debt in-
vestments of limited maturity. The increasing hazard of loss in market value as
maturity lengthens should be one factor in preventing dividend yields from reaching
as low levels as bond yields. In applying this principle to common stock price
analysis, one must avoid too great reliance on published current dividend yields of
particular stocks because in a given market the price may be discounting dividend
expectations greatly different from the going dividend.
Sill another argument that the supply of equity funds has been inadequate is
found in the small amount of common stocks sold relative to bonds in the last few
years. Comparative figures for the postwar years and the late 192o's when equity
funds were readily available are shown in the accompanying table. While these
figures show greater relative sales of common stock in the 192o's, the difference is
not as substantial as one might imagine. They show a predominance of debt issues
even during the stock market boom of 1926-i929.
NEw CAPITAL IssUES OF ALL CORPORATIONS AND RETAINED EARNINGS
(PERCENTAGES)
1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950
Common stock ......... 12 10 21 36 21 20 13 8 12 14
Preferred stock........ 12 17 22 24 9 21 12 7 7 13
Bonds and notes ...... 76 73 57 40 70 59 75 85 81 73
(BiLL oNs or DoLLAs)
Total newissues ....... 4.3 5.2 1 5.3 6.41 4.7 3.5 114.8 1 5.9 1 5.11 4.3
Retained earnings . 2.3 1.1 2.5 2.3 4.3(d) 7.6 11.6 12.8 8.6 12.5(p)
(d)=deficit; (p) =prelrninary.
Sources: Capital issues-Commercal and Financial Chronicle. Figures exclude investment and holding companies. -Rtained
earnings-1926-30, SrAxMeC. ABsT r or Tnau UNr= STATEs (1935); 1946-50, Sonv or ComsET BusiNrEs 13 (U. S. flcp't Com-
merce, January, 1951).
The chief weakness of such stock and bond data is that they ignore the
most important source of equity capital, namely retained earnings. The amounts
of such retained earnings have been added to the table where they can be com-
pared with the amount of corporate capital issues. Inspection of the table is
sufficient to show the overwhelming importance of the retained earnings during
the postwar period as well as how considerably they increased in relative importance
as compared with the late i92o's. If they were added to the common stock issues
sold the total common equity "financing" would have amounted to 71 per cent in
1948 instead of the 8 per cent for stocks alone. Even in 1929 the combination of
common stocks and retained earnings were but 53 per cent as compared with the
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36 per cent shown in the table for common stocks alone. The figures might be used
to argue that such a relatively large use of retained earnings in the postwar years was
itself evidence of the difficulty of the conventional common stock financing. It is also
argued that the desire to avoid increased personal income taxes on dividends is a
possible reason for retention instead of distribution. But with today's wide distri-
bution of stock ownqership by the large corporations which dominate over-all figures,
management is probably less concerned on this point than for the smaller corpora-
tion owned by a limited group. The latter are much more apt to prefer reinvest-
ment and appreciation over dividends. Management of major industrial corporations
has probably been more influenced by the feeling that postwar earnings were in part
an economic fiction. Earnings were increased by inventory price inflation and the
effect of depreciation charges too small to replace the assets at the higher price
level.27 Financing of such "expansion" by retained earnings rather than by new
securities would seem desirable.
Various other lesser factors should enter into the interpretation of the statistics
of capital issues as they relate to balance in corporate financing:
(I) New bond financing may understate the debt accretions because of bank
borrowing not included. Other long-term debt than bonds may also be
omitted.
(2) All debt is constantly being reduced by sinking funds and other payments.
Common stocks are a source of substantially permanent funds.
(3) Bonds which are convertible into common stock appear among the debt
issues but may be exchanged shortly after into common, thereby providing
indirect equity financing. Such issues have been especially popular in
utility circles since 1945, whereas during the late 1920's common stock was
more commonly sold directly through rights. American Telephone and
Telegraph Company has been a prime example selling 1,o95 million dollars
of convertible debentures 'during the five years 1946-195o. Conversions of
these bonds during the same period reduced bonds and increased stock by
65o million dollars and brought in 234 million dollars of paid-in surplus.
Other prominent users of convertible bonds have been Detroit Edison and
Consolidated Gas Electric Light and Power Company of Baltimore.
(4) Some writers also include depreciation funds as a source of equity money.
To the extent that a business has enough income to cover all expenses in-
cluding the allowances for depreciation and depletion, funds are available
17 One estimate of the inflation influence on reported profits is as follows:
Corporation Profits
billions of dollars) 1946 1947 1949 1948 1950
As reported ........................ 13.9 18.5 20.9 17.0 21.9
As corrected ....................... 7.4 10.7 16.I x6.7 14.1
Differences .................... 6.5 7.8 4.8 0.3 7.8
Source: Machinery and Allied Products Institute, Chicago.
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either for replacement of the depreciated assets or for other general corporate
purposes. The allowance itself is a bookkeeping writedown and not a cash
outlay. When the resulting cash is not needed immediately for replacement
it may pay for additional plant, equipment, or inventory that expands
capacity. However, since such purchases are merely supposed to offset the
losses in value of the depreciating assets, they are not included here. Their
importance for financing either for replacement or new assets may be
judged from their rise from 4.2 billion dollars in 1946 to 7.0 billion dollars
in 1950.8
Any attempt to decide how well balanced debt and equity financing have been
must be based upon the net effect new financing, plowed-back earnings, debt retire-
ment, conversions, and similar items have had upon the over-al financial condition
of business. Probably no sector of business has viewed the equity market with
more concern than the utilities. Their extraordinary expansion after 1945 required
equity money to keep capital structures in balance. Unlike most industrials, the
utility finds retained earnings inadequate for growth partly because earnings are
limited by regulation and partly because credit standing has required the sub-
stantial distribution of the bulk of earnings as dividends.
The balance of debt and equity interests in the capital structures of electric utilities
is shown in the accompanying table.
CAPITAL STRuCruRE PROPORTIONS OF PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIc UTILITIES
IN TMr UNITED STATES: 1939-1949
(in percentages)
1949 1948 1947 1946 1945 1944 1943 1942 1941 1940 1939
Long-term debt ..... 49-.3 49.1 46.8 46.1 46.5 46.1 46.6 46.9 46.9 47.3 48.1
Preferred stock ...... 13.8 13.9 15. 15.2 15.7 15.5 15.1 14.8 14.4 14.2 14.2
Common stock ..... 28. 28. 29. 29.3 30.2 30.5 30.5 31.0 31.0 30.8 30.6
Surplus ............. 8.9 9.0 9.2 9.4 7.6 7.9 7.8 7.3 7.7 7.7 7.1
Source: STATITICS OP Erxcrarc UT-xLnES ne TnE UNrUED STATES, 1949 VIII (Federal Power Commis on, 1050).
While the proportion of debt has grown from a low of 46.x per cent in 1946 to 49.3
per cent in 1949, that increase is in large part only a reversal of the decrease from
48.1 per cent in 1939. During the war when construction was sharply restricted,
debt could be retired with depreciation money. Such moderate changes can hardly
be regarded as markedly affecting utility solvency.
Outside the utility field the characteristic reliance upon retained earnings for the
bulk of equity money has left long-term debt within the capacity of business to pay.
Increasing bank loans have also been moderate in relation to the growing working
capital of business. Banks as a class have been inclined to caution after the experi-
ences of the early 193o's. The dominance of the institutional lender in the field of
"s SuRvEY op CuRmREr BxsINss 13 (U. S. Dep't Commercc, January, x951).
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long-term debt financing has probably meant stricter standards than during the
x92o's when so much of the corporate debt was sold to individual investors.29
But the over-all figures of business are dominated by big corporations and the
question might still be raised as to the availability of adequate equity funds for
smaller concerns and for new ventures. Earlier reference was made to the vitality
of small business as reflected in the recent growth in the number of new concerns.
The financing of these new concerns has been studied by the Department of Com-
merce. A sample survey of over a thousand new retail and wholesale trade firms
during the period from 1945 to 1947 was made. On this basis the report concluded :8
... of the estimated $7 billion total of initial capital requirements by new trade firms
during the 1945-7 period, about 63% was financed by the personal savings of the entre-
preneur, 14% by bank loans, 8% by supplier credit and about i1% by other loans, mainly:
from friends and relatives.
A small amount of the remaining 4 per cent was supplied by the capital markets,
chiefly in the form of equity capital for new wholesale concerns. Of the approxi-
mately one billion of bank loans only about io per cent of the number and 4 per cent-
of the value was represented by Veterans Administration guaranteed loans.
A similar survey of about i,ioo manufacturing firms newly established froxii
1946 to 1948 showed a similar predominance of personal savings (6o%) as the soice
of equity capital with other sources somewhat more important (8Y2%) than for trade.
Bank loans (A%), trade credit (io%) and other loans (9/) supplied the creditoi
fundsl.
The importance of personal savings for new concerns is a natural outgrowth "o
a wide distribution of wealth and skills. Some ability to manage one's personal in-
come so as to save is a desirable indication of possible ability to manage the affaiis
of a business thriftily' Creditors like to see a businessman able and willing to risk
some capital of his own. Once business ability is demonstrated, credit that par-
takes of the nature of equity capital often follows. Such credit grows out of the
, In contrast, the Government through the continuance of F.H.A. guarantees into the boom years
has encouraged 8o and 9o per cent loans. Such percentages are higher than those made during the
xago's by institutions which later experienced losses. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation, another
Government agency, has made some notably higher percentage loans. States and municipalities are
increasingly financing new ventures without any equity capital by the use of revenue bonds, i.e., bonds
dependent upon net earnings rather than taxes.
"°Lawrence Bridge, Capital Requirements of New Trade Firms, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS iA
(U. S. Dep't Commerce, Dec. 1948).
"
1 Bridge and Holmes, Capital Requirements of New Manufacturing Firms, StvY OF'CURRENT
BusiNEss II (U. S. Dep't Commerce, April, 1950). Some further corroborative evidence of the ability
of the small business to maintain its place in American business is found in statistics comparing the per
cent of the national income by unincorporated and incorporated units annually from 1929 to 1948.
The former would presumably be chiefly small and the latter large business. Because of the many
factors affecting their interpretation, the data are only mentioned here. SUtvEY OF CURtEN BusINEss io
(U. S. Dep't Commerce, July, r949).
" RODERICK F. MCDoNALD, ADEQUACY OF SUPPLY OF CAPITAL FOR THE FoRMATIoN AND GROWTH OF
SMALL BUSINESS (unpublished doctoral thesis, Northwestern University, 195i) examines a number of new
businesses, which illustrate the importance of personal qualities to survival and success as well as the
variety of capital sources that are open to them.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
pressure to sell merchandise and to find profitable investment. Equity-like credits
rather than actual equity investment fit the young business partly because of the
jealous manner in which the owners seek to retain undiluted control and independ-
ence, and partly because those extending credit would find it time-consuming and
unprofitable to spend the supervisory effort which would have to go with adequate
control. Credits that are short-term may provide fairly permanent sources of capital
so long as the business debtor gains their continuing renewal by meeting his obliga-
tions with reasonable promptness. Many devices exist for minimizing the need for
equity capital, such as the rental of space for operations as well as the use of credit
in the purchase of equipment, merchandise, and supplies.
Long-term credits and equity investment by outsiders are difficult to achieve for
most small businesses on an economic basis because of their impermanence. This lack
of permanence is associated with the dependence of such concerns upon one or two
persons for continuance rather than upon a self-renewing organization with a large
personnel. It also results from the rapidity with which a small working capital can
be dissipated by operating losses and drawings of the owner8 3 Equity capital for
the small business is most logically supplied by the operator-owners or those closely
associated with them. If success follows, the small business may grow rapidly from
retained earnings and the credit which success commands. Retained profits for
small business may be labor-return of the owner rather than the pure capital-return
of the large corporation, which explains why the percentage growth may be star-
tling34 Successful owners often show a willingness to let their living expenditures
lag behind their earning power.
The competitive system is directed to supplying goods and services that the
community wants at the lowest costs. In so far as earnings are a satisfactory measure
of economic want and low costs, a system that leans heavily on retained earnings
for equity capital will favor the growth of the low-cost and efficient business units.
Rather than forbidding or limiting entry to'business, our economic system depends
upon the forces of competition to regulate the major supply of equity funds (free
entry is, of course, limited in certain fields, as in public utilities and banking).
The existing high birth rate of small business suggests that any increase brought
about by making equity capital more available might add little to the population.
It might only increase the death rate by an equal amount. The justification for
stimulating the birth rate in an already well-populated business environment is
doubtful. Perhaps the best argument can be made in the field of new manufacturing
This point is overlooked by the advocates of a system of government-guarantccd "equity-like" loans
for small business that would parallel the F.H.A. guaranteed-mortgages loan system. The latter is
secured by real estate of relatively permanent value; the small business loan rests upon an interest in
assets which can shrink, be drained off, or become debt-encumbered with distressing speed.
" An interesting example of inverse correlation between size and growth rate is given in a list of 292
manufacturing corporations, whose financial statements became available after 1945 because of a sale of
securities to the public. Sales expansion between 1945 and 1949 ranged from 94 per cent for corporations
with sales under $2.5 million to 20 per cent for those with sales of $20-25 million. Monthly Letter on
Economic Conditions (National City Bank of New York, Dec. X950).
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ventures offering novel products or production methods or bringing industries to
areas that seem fitted for economic production. Even here the search for business
opportunities by existing concerns, by new enterprisers, and by communities seeking
industry must be kept in mind. However, special institutions continue to be pro-
posed and to be founded to aid in this job. The work of the recently founded
American Research and Development Corporation, of the Industrial Development
Bank (Canada), and the Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation, Ltd.
(Great Britain), of regional institutions fostered by commercial bankers and others,
and legislative proposals such as the investment companies proposed in the Lucas-
Spence bill are indicative of interested efforts to mend any gaps in this field of
financing.a However, the limited operations of institutions of this type as well as
the experience of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and Federal Reserve banks
when given extended powers suggest but limited opportunities for new institutions.
In this connection the function of the stock market is often misunderstood and
understated. Because new and small concerns cannot resort directly to the registered
exchanges for money, they are regarded as playing no part in providing new venture
capital. Actually a large part of the funds for any such venture is derived not from
new current savings but from the liquidation of existing investment or specu-
lative holdings. Liquidity is the essence of a good market for instruments
of equity finance. Here is the cashier's window where old stocks may be cashed
to buy new. Here, too, is the place for cashing in on successfully invested
retained earnings. Not only is this true for the large corporation whose stock
is already listed, but it is also true by indirection for the lesser, medium-sized busi-
ness. Because of the stock market, the owners of the latter can sell all or a part of
their holdings of a closely held venture once it has been built up to the requisite size.
Or, they may merge it with a corporation whose stock is listed and sell the resulting
shares. Marketability of stocks either present or prospective makes equity investment
much more attractive. Such popularization of common stocks is especially im-
portant in a country that wishes a wide distribution of its wealth and uses inheritance
and gift taxes that require partial liquidation of large estates.
CONCLUSIONS
The review of the problem of equity financing leads to the conclusion that
American business has met its requirements remarkably well in spite of the lack of
participation by major financial institutions and the increased burdens of taxation
upon the conventional sources of equity money as found in corporate net income and
personal incomes in the upper brackets. The commercial and savings banks, the
savings and loan associations, and even the life insurance company do not appear
well fitted to become equity investors in more than a minor way in view of their
"The problems and institutions in this area are more fully discussed by Schmidt, Meeting the Long-
Term Capital Requirements of Small Business, 6 J. FINANCE 143-149 (June, 1951).
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fixed dollar liabilities. A paucity of surplus over their indebtedness makes it hard
for them to meet the solvency problem created by possible shrinkage of stock values.
Such shrinkage may arise from ordinary business risks, cyclical fluctuations of busi-
ness, or price level deflation. In this respect, some common stocks such as those of
certain utilities may prove less vulnerable and more appropriate than others for
limited investment. Two rising institutional channels give promise of directing
more funds into equity channels. Both pension funds and investment companies
draw savings from the low and moderate income groups. Their expected expansion
is likely to be an increasingly important element in the stock market. Such a tapping
of middle class savings is important in view of the generally held view that larger
incomes and savings from such incomes have been hard hit by high federal taxes.
A continuance of the factors favorable to equity investment could result not
only in an increased flow of current savings into common stocks but also a shifting
of existing liquid savings from existing financial institutions. Higher yields and
possible appreciation are potent stimuli where the individual is intent upon long-run
accumulation as for retirement rather than desirous of liquidity to meet emergencies
or short-term needs. Even life insurance companies might be affected by a greater
demand for term and ordinary life at the expense of limited payment and endowment
policies if accumulation through investment companies appears more attractive to
mbre. people. By providing more adequately for old-age retirement, pensions and
,federal Old Age insurance make term insurance more suitable as compared with
policies that have a large investment element and require large reserves.
While the pension funds and investment companies are likely to concentrate upon
the more seasoned stocks of major corporations, their buying will influence the whole
market supply of equity funds. The stock market with its publicized prices and
liquidity offers a constant means of comparison and an opportunity for easy shifting
where bargains appear. Higher prices and lower yields for the more highly rated
stocks will tend to raise the market value of less well rated issues. The more ample
the supply of equity funds the more readily will funds become available for small
as well as large enterprises.
Special institutions or measures for increasing the availability of either equity
or credit funds have been tried and are frequently discussed. Useful though they
ray. be, they have been relatively unimportant in directing funds into business
channels save on special occasions as during the business depression of the 193o's.
Even then the valuable work of such governmental agencies as the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation and the Home Owners' Loan Corporation was almost wholly
to assume the investment burdens of other institutions temporarily rather than to
meet, new capital problems. During World War II, however, the R.F.C., the De-
fense'Plant' Corporation, and ihe Smaller War Plants Corporation did yeoman
service in aiding the war effort.
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The economic problem of equity capital, whether sought in the form of common
stock or less obviously as marginal credit, will doubtless continue to receive con-
siderable attention. However, the evidence of growth in equity capital, particularly
as reflected in the record of retained earnings of established business and the forma-
tion of new business units in the postwar years, would strongly indicate that the
problem is one which chiefly bothers the individual concern or a particular sector
of business. The progress of the economy as a whole and its ability to balance debt
increases with equity investment indicate that a shortage of equity capital has been
no serious obstacle to business expansion and high productivity.
